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DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS FOR
EMERGENCY CIVIL COMMITMENTS:
SAFEGUARDING PATIENTS' LIBERTY
WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING HEALTH AND
SAFETY
INTRODUCTION
Upset about a dying friend, Susan Rockwell was anxious and a bit
disheveled when she arrived at a Massachusetts hospital to attend a
support group meeting.' The dirty coat she wore belied her achieve-
ments as a law school graduate and former librarian. 2 Based on her
appearance and a brief conversation, an emergency room doctor or-
dered attendants to put Rockwell in a four-point restraint, inject her
with drugs and place her in a locked room in the hospital's psychiatric
wards Throughout this ordeal, the hospital refused Rockwell's pleas
to call her psychiatrist, who later said that she would have argued
against admission.`' The hospital released Rockwell two-and-a-half days
lawn.' According to her psychiatrist, Rockwell suffers nightmares and
flashbacks—symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder—as a result of
this expericnce. 6
The emergency room physician admitted Susan Rockwell pursu-
ant to Massachusetts' emergency involuntary commitment statutc. 7
The statute authorizes a qualified physician to admit a person for ten
days of psychiatric care if the physician believes that failure to admit
would create a likelihood of serious harm to the person or to others?'
A physician's decision to admit a person pursuant to the emergency
involuntary commitment statute is not subject to judicial review."
Rather, a hospital must. seek judicial authorization for commitment
only if it desires to keep a patient longer than the ten-day emergency
See Mitchell Zuckoff, Flawed Law Thrns Patients to Prisoners: 'Section 22' Admissions Fuel a
Booming Hospital Business, BOSTON GLOBE, May 12, 1997, at Al.
2 See id.
3 See id.
4 See id.
5 See id.
6 See Zuckoff, supra note 1, at Al,
7 See id,
See Mass. GEN. Laws ANN, ch. 123, § 12 (West 1997).
9 See id,
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674	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 (Vol. 10:673
period. 10 Since the Massachusetts statute allows courts fourteen days to
schedule a hearing on a hospital's commitment petition, a person may
be involuntarily confined in a psychiatric ward for up to twenty-four
days without judicial review."
Susan Rockwell's experience illustrates the need for persons sub-
ject to emergency commitment to have a means of challenging physi-
cians' decisions to admit them. 12 The emergency commitment process
deprives persons of their liberty, yet contains significantly fewer proce-
dural due process safeguards than does the justice system at large." At
the same time, however, the emergency commitment process exists to
provide care in a timely manner for persons whose mental illnesses,
physicians believe, pose a likelihood of serious harm to themselves or
others.' 4 The consequences of failing to commit when emergency com-
mitment is warranted can be fatal. Therefore, an effective emergency
commitment statute must contain both procedural safeguards to pro-
tect persons wrongly committed and provide immediate care for those
who need it.
This Note explores what the goals of procedural due process
should be in the context of emergency commitment. 15 Part I defines
procedural due process and describes the constitutional status of the
law on due process in the emergency commitment context.' 6 Part I
then discusses different perspectives on what procedural safeguards
should be provided in the emergency commitment process.''' Part II
describes Massachusetts' review of its emergency commitment statute
and one of the proposed procedural schemes resulting from that re-
view." Part III analyzes this proposal as a means of addressing the
general policy issues involved." Part III concludes that the proposal
should be adopted because it protects patients' liberty without com-
promising clinical interests.20 Specifically, Part III argues that providing
judicial review for all persons within forty-eight hours of emergency ad-
mission is harmful to the clinical interests of most patients and, in
many cases, does not provide meaningful protection of liberty inter-
16 See id.
11 See id. § 7(c).
12 See Zuckoff, supra note 1, at Al.
13 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 12 (West 1997).
14 See id.
15 See infra Parts I, II and III.
16 See infra notes 26-78 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 79-119 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 120-87 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 188-218 and accompanying text.
20
 See infra notes 188-218 and accompanying text.
Match 1999]	 EMERGENCY CIVIL COMMITMENTS 	 675
ests. 2 ' The best means of protecting patients' rights in practice is
instead to appoint counsel immediately upon emergency admission
and provide a process for an emergency hearing in cases of inappro-
priate commitment. 22
1. DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS FOR EMERGENCY INVOLUNTARY
COMMITMENTS
This section is divided into three subsections. Subsection A defines
procedural due process and describes how the Supreme Court deter-
mines what procedural safeguards due process requires." Subsection
B discusses the status of the law on duc process requirements for
emergency commitment." Subsection C explores three perspectives on
the emergency commitment process."
A. Procedural Due Process Defined
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
prohibits state governments from depriving a person of "life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law."" This amendment. is rooted
in the notion that personal freedom requires an institutional check on
arbitrary government action. 27 Procedural due process consists of pro-
cedural safeguards that accord a person the right to be heard before
being deprived of life, liberty or property as a result of government
action."
Two competing approaches to procedural duc process shape dis-
cussions of what procedural safeguards are constitutionally required—
or even desirable. 29 The first approach focuses on the intrinsic value
of due process as an opportunity for people to participate in govern-
ment decisions that affect them and thereby express their dignity as
persons.s° justice Frankfurter supported this approach by writing that
there is no better way "for generating the feeling, so important to
21 See infra notes 188-218 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 188-218 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 39-78 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 79-119 and accompanying text.
26 U.S CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment states in relevant part: "nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law , 	 ."
Id.
27 See LAURENCE II. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTEI UTIONAI. LAW 664 (2d ed. 1988).
28 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,332-33 (1976); TRIBE, Supra note 27, at 664.
"See -1'nm, supra note 27, at 666.
38 See id,
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popular government, that justice has been done."" The United States
Supreme Court, however, has adopted an "instrumental" approach,
which views due process as a means of assuring accuracy, reasoning
that the Constitution requires process "to prevent unfair and mistaken
deprivations."32
Pursuant to the instrumental approach, the Supreme Court bal-
ances competing interests when determining the required form of
procedural due process." Thus, in 1976, in Mathews v. Eldridge, the
Court noted that "` [ (I] ue process,' unlike some legal rules, is not a
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances."31 In Eldridge, the Court held that an evidentiary hear-
ing was not required prior to termination of social security disability
benefits." A person brought an action challenging the constitutional
validity of the administrative procedures used to terminate her disabil-
ity benefits because the procedures did not include an evidentiary
hearing prior to termination. 36 In concluding that due process did not
require an evidentiary hearing prior to termination, the Court iden-
tified three factors that must be weighed to determine what procedural
due process requires: (1) the private interest that will be affected by
the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the
private interest through the procedures used and the probative value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards and (3) the
government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute proce-
dural requirements would entail." Thus, the Court concluded that due
process is flexible arid the procedural protections it requires vary
according to the facts and interests of particular situations."
31 joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
52 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97 (1972).
33 See TRIBE, supra note 27, at 714-15.
34 Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 334 (holding that due process does not require evidentiary hearing
prior to termination of disability benefits) (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
895 (1961)).
35 See id. at 349.
36 See id. at 324-25.
37 See id. at 335. For a critique of the Eldridge balancing test. see TRIBE, supra note 27, at
717-18 (arguing that adequate protection cannot be afforded by "balancing" general interests of
majority against those of individual).
38 See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 334.
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B. Status of Law on Due Process Requirements for Emergency
Involuntary Commitment
Over the past four decades, changes in the ways mental illness is
treated and perceived have greatly affected civil commitment. 39 First,
the introduction of psychotropic drugs in the 1950s enabled many
previously institutionalized patients to live outside mental hospitals."
Second, during the 1960s and 1970s, revelations of poor living condi-
tions in state hospitals for the mentally retarded sensitized the public
to the plight of the institutionalized mentally ill and led to the inclu-
sion of this group in the growing civil rights movement. 41 Legal reforms
during the 1970s reduced the broad discretion previously given to
psychiatrists by restricting involuntary commitment to persons demon-
strably dangerous to themselves or others and applying to the commit-
ment process the due process safeguards of the criminal justice sys-
tem:12 As a result of these clinical, social and legal developments, the
average number of persons subject to commitment in state and county
mental hospitals per day declined from 560,000 in 1955 to 276,000 in
1972, and to about 138,000 in 1981. 43
Despite the attention given to the emergency commitment process
in recent decades, the Supreme Court has not clearly defined the due
process requirements for emergency civil commitment, and as a result,
commitment procedures vary considerably from state to state." Lower
court decisions in the early 1970s held that due process required a
probable cause hearing within forty-eight hours after commitment:15
Subsequent Supreme Court summary affirmances of other decisions,
however, indicate that substantially longer periods of commitment
without judicial review are constitutional." More recent lower federal
39
 See Uri Avirani & Robert A. Weyer, Changing Trends in Mental I lealth Legislation: Anatomy
of Reforming a Civil Commitment Law, 211 HEALTH Pot..	 & L. 771, 771-72 (1996); Mary
C. McCarron, Comment, The Right to Refuse Antipsychatic Drugs: Safeguarding the Mentally In-
competent Patient's Right to Procedural Due Process, 73 MAKI. L. REV. '177, 480-81 (1990); Clifford
D. Stromberg Sc Alan A. Stone, Statute: A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally
20 tinily. J. ote LEc.Is. 275, 275-78 (1983).
"See McCarron, supra note 39, at 480-81. For a discussion of the uses and effects of
psychotropic drugs, see Elizabeth Symonds, Mental Patients' Rights to Refuse Drugs: Involuntary
Medication As Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 7 lInsTINds CoNs.r. L.Q. 701, 704-11 (1980).
41 See MIcirim, L. PERLIN, MENIAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 4 (1989); Aviram
& Weyer, supra note 39, at 781-84; Stromberg & Stone, supra note 39, at 276.
42 See Stromberg Stanc, supra note 39, at 276.
43 See id. at 277.
44 See ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENST•IN, THE RIGHTS OF PF.OPLE WITH MENTAL
DISABILITIES 71 (1996).
4' See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1091 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
46 See French v. Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. 1351, 1356 (M.D.N.C. 1977), affd mem., 443 U.S.
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court decisions have held that constitutionality depends not on the
specific timing of judicial review, but on the totality of the procedural
scheme provided by the statute. 47
One of the first cases to address this issue was Lessard v. Schmidt."
In 1972, in Lessard, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin struck down a Wisconsin statute permitting con-
finement for 145 days and held that the maximum period that a person
may be detained without a preliminary hearing is forty-eight hours."
The suit was brought as a class action on behalf of the plaintiff and all
other persons eighteen years of age or older who were being held
involuntarily pursuant to any emergency, temporary or permanent
commitment provision of the Wisconsin involuntary commitment stat-
ute." The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief against
the enforcement of certain portions of the statute. 5 ' Noting that the
interests of those facing involuntary civil commitment are at least as
great as those of accused criminals, the court reasoned that emergency
civil commitment can be justified only for the length of time necessary
to arrange for a probable cause hearing before a neutral judge. 52 The
court, therefore, held that a preliminary hearing must be held within
forty-eight hours."
Subsequent decisions gave greater weight to the clinical needs of
the mentally ill. 54 In the 1970s, the United States Supreme Court
summarily affirmed two lower court decisions upholding substantial
periods of commitment. 55 These decisions effectively overruled Lessard
and indicate that a prompt probable cause hearing is not necessary to
satisfy due process requirements."
First, in 1973, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed Logan v.
Arafeh, in which a three-judge district court panel upheld a Connecti-
,
901 (1979); Logan v. Arafeh, 346 F. Stipp. 1265, 1268 (D. Conn. 1972), afrd sub nom. Briggs v.
Arafeh, 411 U.S. 911 (1973). United States Supreme Court summary decisions arc binding on
lower courts. See hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1975).
47 See Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 975 (2d Cir. 1983).
48 See Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1091.
45 See Id. at 1082, 1091.
50 See id. at 1082.
51 See id.
52 See id. at 1090.
53 See Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1091.
54 See PERLIN, supra note 41, at 213.
55 See Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. at 1356; Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. at 1268.
5u See Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. at 1356; Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. at 1268; LEVY Se RUBENSTEIN,
supra note 44, at 71. But see PERLIN, supra note 41, at 214 (sharp split over question of constitu-
tional right to preliminary hearing not settled entirely by Supreme Court's summary affirmance
in Blackburn).
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cut statute providing for emergency commitment for up to forty-five
days without judicial review. 57 In Arafeh, individuals who were, or at one
time had been, involuntary patients at a state mental hospital peti-
tioned the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
for declaratory and injunctive relief against the statute's enforcement."
The statute provided that if a patient is committed involuntarily for
more than fifteen days, there must be a judicial determination of the
validity of his or her confinement within forty-five days from the date
of the initial commitment. 59 The court reasoned that there was a rea-
sonable connection between the time allowed before judicial review
and the objective sought." The court noted that the purpose of com-
mitment is treatment and care, not penal detention, and that physi-
cians need time to gain knowledge of a patient's mental condition
through visual observation and diagnostic tests. 6' This period of obser-
vation and treatment, the court observed, also has the positive aspect
of allowing the hospital staff to alleviate the symptoms of the patient's
mental illness or determine that the patient need not be committed."
In such cases, the court reasoned, the patient avoids the stigma of a
court record and the length of confinement is shortened.° The court
also noted that patients may at any time challenge the legality of their
confinement through a habeas corpus proceeding in the state courts.G 4
Therefore, the court held that the Connecticut statute satisfied consti-
tutional due process requirements."
Then, in 1979, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed French v.
Blackburn, in which a three-judge district court panel upheld a North
Carolina statute that permitted a ten-day period between emergency
detention and a probable cause hearing." In Blackburn, the plaintiff,
who had been subjected to an involuntary commitment procedure that
led to a hearing resulting in his release, petitioned the United States
District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina for declaratory
and injunctive relief challenging the validity of the North Carolina
statute.° The statute provided for a final hearing on commitment
57
 See Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. at 1268.
56 See id. at 1266-67.
59 See id. at 1267-68.
60 See id. at 1268.
at See id. at 1269.
62 See Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. at 1269.
63 See id.
64 See id.
65 See id. at 1270.
66 See Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. at 1356.
67 See id, at 1353.
680	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 40:673
within ten days of initial commitment unless the respondent is given
a continuance, which may be for up to five days at a time.° The court
noted that the purpose of the statute was humanitarian and that during
the pre-hearing period of confinement, a patient receives treatment
that may aid his or her mental health and be necessary for an adequate
and informed commitment hearing. 69 Moreover, the court reasoned
that the statute afforded opportunities for physicians to release a pa-
tient prior to the commitment hearing. 7° Finally, relying on the Su-
preme Court's summary affirmance of Arafeh as binding precedent,
the court held that the ten-day commitment period prior to a hearing
did not violate due process?'
More recent lower court decisions have also held that a probable
cause hearing is not necessary to satisfy due process requirements. 72
For example, in 1983, in Project Release v. Prevost, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld New York statutes
providing for involuntary commitment for up to sixty days and emer-
gency commitment for ,up to fifteen days without a judicial hearing,
unless one is requested. 73 Project Release is a not-for-profit corporation
that filed a suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the New York
involuntary and emergency commitment statutes violated the Four-
teenth Amendment." In rejecting the need for a prompt probable
cause hearing, the court considered the layers of professional and
judicial review provided by the statutes and found that the totality of
the procedural scheme comported with due process. 75 The court noted
that civil commitment is not tantamount to criminal detention and,
therefore, does not demand the same procedural safeguards required
in the criminal context. 76
 Finally, noting that the substantive standards
for civil commitment vary from state to state, the court stressed that
the decision by some states to limit pre-hearing confinement to a
shorter period does not mean that such a model is needed or is even
68 See id. at 1355.
69 See id.
7° See id.
71 See Blackburn, 428 E Supp, at 1356.
72 See Project Release, 722 E2d at 974; Donahue v. Rhode Island Dept of Mental Health, 632
F, Supp. 1456,1470 (D.R.1. 1986) (upholding constitutionality of statute providing for involuntary
commitment of alcoholics for 10 days without judicial hearing); In re Z.O., 484 A.2d 1287,1291
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) (upholding constitutionality of 27-day commitment prior to
hearing).
78 See Project Release, 722 F.2d at 974.
74 See id. at 963.
5 See id. at 974, 975.
76 See id. at 974-75.
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adaptable to the needs of all states:77 Thus, the court concluded that
due process does not require a prompt probable cause hearing. 78
C. Perspectives on Procedural Requirements for Emergency Commitment
Constitutionality is only the first step in analyzing any procedural
scheme. Because the United States Constitution sets only minimum
due process requirements, states arc free to provide more than the
minimum requirements mandated by the Constitution. 75
 Thus, even
though a procedural scheme meets due process requirements, the
question remains whether additional due process protections should
be provided. This subsection will explore this question from the per-
spectives of the three interests at stake in the emergency commitment
process: the liberty, the clinical and the public interests. 8°
1. The Liberty Interest
A civil libertarian approach to procedural due process rejects the
idea set forth in Eldridge that procedural safeguards should be deter-
mined by balancing a person's liberty interest against the government's
interest, the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty and the probative
value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards. 81 Under this
analysis, for example, the threat of erroneous deprivation of liberty
cannot be outweighed by concerns of government and judicial re-
sources." Thus, where a pre-deprivation hearing is not possible, a
prompt post-deprivation hearing should be held as soon as possible."
With respect to the emergency commitment process, advocates for
prompt probable cause hearings often draw an analogy to criminal
procedure." Noting that the law affords accused criminals hearings
77 See id. at 975 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979)).
78 See Project Release, 722 F.2d at 974.
79 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 n.5 (Mass. 1995); ROBERT F.
WILLIAMS, STATE CoxsTrruTioNAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 68 (1988); Mark R. Sullivan, Due
Process, 27 RUTGERS Lj. 1051, 1053, 1055 (1996).
"I was film exposed to many of the ideas in the following sections during meetings of the
Massachusetts District Court's ad hoc committee to review section 12, for which 1 served as a
research assistant. See infra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
81 See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.
97 See Minority Report of the Ad floc Committee to Review G.L. ch. 123, § 12, at 3-4 (Oct.
21, 1997) (unpublished, on file with author) [hereinafter Minority Report] ("The administrative
burdens, if ally, of this concurrent approach arc simply outweighed by the compelling considera-
tions of shorter involuntary admissions, greater protection of individual rights, and closer adher-
ence to the dictates of the Constitution.").
" See id. at 1.
94 See Lessard, 349 F. Stipp. at 1090.
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within twenty-four hours, they ask why persons committed involuntar-
ily, who arc accused of no crime, should be afforded less due process
protection.85 Thus, the argument follows that the liberty interest of a
person committed involuntarily is at least as high as that of an accused
criminal. 86 In support of this argument, advocates for immediate hear-
ings cite the serious consequences of involuntary commitment, includ-
ing humiliation, potential loss of employment and the stigma attached
to commitment. 87
Moreover, the absence of prompt judicial review of emergency
commitment ignores the intrinsic value of due process. 88 A prompt
judicial hearing on commitment would allow persons to have a voice
in the decision to deprive them of their liberty. 89 Civil libertarians argue
that this process is essential to respect the dignity of those committed
involuntarily and to generate a sense of justice and fairness in the
commitment process."
2. The Clinical Interest
Clinicians emphasize the therapeutic nature of the commitment
process, reasoning that they neither seek to have an adversarial rela-
tionship with their patients nor to deprive patients of their liberty. 91
They believe, therefore, that it is inappropriate to impose a criminal
model on what is essentially a therapeutic process. 92 Rather, it is im-
perative that a procedural scheme both safeguard patients' liberty and
provide access to clinical care."
85 See Shoshana's Psychiatric Survivors' Guide, (visited Jan. 30, 1998) <http://www.harbor-
side.com/home/e/equinox/glossary/hun >. A former patient defines involuntary commitment
as
lain unconstitutional and horrifyingly abused legal process by which—in the ab-
sence of any destructive activity, and on nothing more than the word of a single
[mental health professional]—a [person] can be stripped of his civil rights and
imprisoned in a psychiatric facility, with no form of recourse whatsoever, in most
states for a period up to 72 hours.
See id.
86 See Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1090.
87 See id. at 1089; Minority Report, supra note 82, at 3; JUDI CHAMBERLIN, ON OUR OWN:
PATIENT-CONTROLLED ALTERNATIVES TO 'ME MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 70, 75, 83 (1978).
Bs See TRIBE, supra note 27, at 666.
39 See id.
8° See id.
81 See Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. at 1355; Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. at 1269; Donald H. J. IIermanti,
Barriers to Providing Effective Treatment: A Critique of Revisions in Procedural, Substantive, and
Dispositional Criteria in Involuntary Civil Commitment, 39 VAND. L. REV. 83, 94-95 (1986).
92
 See Project Release, 722 F.2d at 974-75; Hermann, supra note 91, at 94,
93 See Hermann, supra note 91, at 93-95, 106.
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In addition to expressing concerns that using a criminal model in
the commitment process needlessly antagonizes the doctor-patient re-
lationship, many fear that too many procedural safeguards may serve
as a barrier to treatment. 94 Too much judicial scrutiny may make it
difficult to commit many persons in need of treatment, i.e., the very
persons whom the emergency commitment process was designed to
protect." Thus, while a prompt probable cause hearing may be the best
means of protecting patients' liberty interests, it may jeopardize their
clinical in terests. 96
Clinicians also express concern about the burdens that hearings
place on the clinical process. In addition to the harm that hearings
cause to the doctor-patient relationship, they place large demands on
clinicians' time.° It is not in the best interest of all patients to have
clinicians devoting large amounts of time to commitment proce-
dures—time that could be spent attending to the clinical needs of
patients."
3. The Public Interest
Concern about the impact of the emergency commitment proce-
dures on the public leads others to ask whether layers of judicial
review—providing only minimal protection—consume too many lim-
ited judicial resources." According to this perspective, society cannot
1" See id.
95 See id.
" See id.
97 See Thompson v. Commonwealth, 438 N.E.2d 33, 37 (Mass. 1982). In Thompson, the
Supreme judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld chapter 123, section 9(b) of the Massachusetts
General Laws, which authorized persons who have been found guilty of a criminal charge and
committed to the state psychiatric hospital to apply for discharge. See id. at 34. The statute
provided for a prompt judicial hearing. See id. at 35. The trial court granted the Commonwealth's
motion for summary judgment of the plaintiff's application filed pursuant to section 9(b). See id.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that due process required the burden to rest on the Common-
wealth in section 9(b) proceedings. See id. In concluding that allocating the burden of proof to
the applicant was constitutional, the court reasoned, in part, that placing the burden on the
Commonwealth would result in intolerable fiscal and administrative burdens because there would
be no effective means of disposing of or discouraging the filing of frivolous applications by
litigious patients. See id. at 37. The court further reasoned that psychiatrists would be forced to
spend substantially more tirne preparing for and attending judicial hearings instead of caring for
patients, and that funds that could be spent for treatment and care of patients would be spent
in conducting numerous adversary hearings. See id. The court, concluded, therefore, that placing
the burden of proof on the applicant in section 9(b) proceedings did not violate due process.
See id.
99 See id.
" See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 348; Thompson, 438 N.E.2d at 37; Report of the Ad 1-loc Committee
to Review G.L. ch. 123, § 12, at 6 (Oct. 21, 1997) (unpublished, on file with author) [hereinafter
Majority Report].
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focus exclusively on the interests of the individual whose liberty is
deprived.'" Rather, the individual's liberty interest must be considered
in a larger context—one that includes consideration of the costs and
time demands that hearings place on the court system.'"' Thus, al-
though the cost of providing a post-deprivation hearing cannot justify
totally denying an opportunity to be heard, such considerations may
factor into a determination of what type of hearing should be held and
when.'"
4. The Liberty, Clinical and Public Interests Compared
Strict advocacy of any one of the interests involved in the emer-
gency commitment process presents problems. Critics of the civil lib-
ertarian perspective argue that because the purpose of emergency
commitment is therapeutic, it may be detrimental to the patient to
impose a criminal construct on the process.'" While a prompt prob-
able cause hearing may protect a patient's liberty interest, it may also
harm the patient's clinical interest because it transforms the doctor-
patient relationship from a therapeutic to an adversarial one. Thus, in
the first days of a patient's emergency commitment, the doctor must
both treat the patient and oppose him or her in a commitment hear-
ing. Moreover, too much process may serve as a barrier to treatment
because it may discourage or impede commitment of persons in need
of treatment.'"
Some commentators believe that a patient's liberty is better pro-
tected by a probable cause hearing held a few days after commitment
than one held immediately upon commitment.'" Noting that many
acute psychiatric episodes subside within one to four days, they reason
that if hearings were required immediately, many patients whose con-
ditions would have improved sufficiently for discharge in a few days
would be retained unnecessarily for long commitment periods.'" If,
however, hearings were scheduled a few days after commitment, then
many patients would improve sufficiently to be discharged by the
hospital prior to the hearing.'" Moreover, in cases of improper corn-
' 00 See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 348; Thompson, 438 N.E.2d at 37; TRIBE, supra note 27, at 715.
101 See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 348; Thompson, 438 N.E.2d at 37; TRIBE, supra note 27, at 715.
102 See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 348; Thompson, 438 N.E.2d at 37; TutuE, supra note 27, at 715.
103 See Hermann, supra note 91, at 94-95.
1 " See id.
105 See Stromherg & Stone, supra note 39, at 324.
1C16
 See id.
1°7
	 id. This argument is consistent with a study of commitment hearings scheduled in the
Cambridge District Court. See infra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
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mitment, a delay of a few days may also afford a patient's counsel
needed time to marshal the facts of the case before representing his
or her client at a commitment hearing. 1 °8
Critics of the clinical perspective note that it. presumes the need
for a clinical relationship. 109 Where commitment. is improper, there
is no need for a clinical relationship, and the doctor-patient relation-
ship is, by definition, adversarial."° In such cases, concern for a clinical
interest that does not exist jeopardizes the "patient's" liberty in terest. 11 '
With respect to the public perspective, civil libertarians argue that
liberty interests should not be balanced against—much less out-
weighed by—concerns about judicial resources." 2 Under this analysis,
the emergency commitment process should be designed to safeguard
against cases of improper commitment and, therefore, must include
prompt judicial review." 3 Thus, because the individual's liberty is of
primary importance, it cannot be adequately protected by balancing it
against society's concerns about judicial resources."4
The results of a study of commitment petitions filed in the Cam-
bridge Division of the Massachusetts District Court, however, offer
support for the public perspective. The study revealed that more than
sixty-seven percent of emergency commitment hearings scheduled in
the court during an eighteen-month period were canceled." 5 Of the
cases that did not go to a hearing, more than half of the patients were
109 See Letter from !Ion. Jonathan Brant, Justice, Cambridge District Court, to Hon. Maurice
Richardson, Dedham District Court 2 Uuly 21, 1997) (on file with author) [hereinafter Brant].
14" See Ci IAMBERLIN, supra note 87, at xiv.
110 In Susan Rockwell's case, for example, improper commitment deprived her of her liberty
unjustifiably and proved detrimental to her mental health. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying
LexL.
1 " See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
112 See TRIBE, supra note 27, at 718.
"3 See Minority Report, supra note 82, at I.
114 See TRIBE, supra note 27, at 718.
110 See Minority Report, supra note 82, at 3 11,4. The referenced study was conducted by Holt.
Jonathan Brant, Justice, Cambridge District Court and member of the Committee. See Brant, supra
note 108, at 1. Judge Brant reviewed all petifitins for commitment filed under sections 7 and 8
in Cambridge District Court during the period from January 1, 1996 to July 15, 1997—a total of
289 cases. See id. Slightly fewer than one-third of these petitions actually reached a hearing. See
id. Of the cases that did not reach a hearing, more than half of the patients were discharged. See
id. Thus, approximately 38% of patients were discharged between the first and 24th day after
their admission. See id. Adding the roughly five percent of patients who were discharged as a
result of petitions for commitment being denied, it appears that 43% of patients were discharged
on or before the 24th day after admission. See Brant, supra note 108, at 1. Judge Brant noted that
these data reflect only the percentage of persons released after a petition for commitment has
been filed and that a significant percentage of persons admitted under section 12 would have
been released without any petition ever having been filed. See id.
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discharged by the hospital. 116 Approximately five percent of patients
were discharged as a result of petitions for commitment being de-
nied." 7
 This data indicates that involuntary commitment most likely
terminates when the hospital decides to discharge the patient or when
the patient opts to change his or her commitment status. 118
 In light of
such data, those concerned with the effect on the public argue that it
is reasonable to consider the amount of practical protection the com-
mitment hearing process provides relative to the burdens it places on
the judicial system.' 1 '9
MASSACHUSETTS REVIEWS ITS EMERGENCY COMMITMENT STATUTE
In 1997, an article in the Boston Globe (the "Globe") chronicling
abuses of the Massachusetts emergency commitment statute prompted
the Commonwealth to review its emergency commitment proce-
dures.' 2° This section describes that review and the proposed changes
resulting from it. Subsection A describes the Massachusetts emergency
commitment statute and subsection B describes the Globe article that
examined it.' 2 ' Subsection C discusses the responses to the Globe
article, including the proposed changes to the emergency commitment
statute.' 22
A. The Massachusetts Emergency Commitment Statute
In 1970, Massachusetts enacted a statute providing for the emer-
gency commitment of the mentally ill.'" Under this statute, commonly
11 6 See id.
117
 See id.
" 8 See id.
119
 See Thompson, 438 N,E.2d at 37.
1 " See Zuckoff, supra note 1, at Al.
121 See infra notes 123-38 and accompanying text.
122 See infra notes 139-87 and accompanying text.
1 " See Mass. GEN. LAws ANN. ch . 123, § 12 (West 1997). Section 12 states in relevant part:
(a) Any [qualified] physician . , . who after examining a person has reason to
believe that failure to hospitalize such person would create a likelihood of serious
harm by reason of mental illness may restrain or authorize the restraint of such
person and apply for the hospitalization of such person for a ten day period at a
public facility or at a private facility authorized for such purposes.... If an exami-
nation is not possible because of the emergency nature of the case and because of
the refusal of the person to consent to such examination, the physician, qualified
psychologist or qualified psychiatric nurse mental health clinical specialist on the
basis of the facts and circumstances may determine that hospitalization is necessary
and may apply therefore. In an emergency situation, if a physician, qualified psy-
chologist or qualified psychiatric nurse menial health clinical specialist is not
available, a police officer, who believes that failure to hospitalize a person would
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referred to as section 12, a qualified physician may admit a person to
a hospital for a ten-day period "[Of the physician determines that
failure to hospitalize such person would create a likelihood of serious
harm by reason of mental illness." 121 If someone other than a qualified
physician makes an application for admission, the person may be
admitted only after a qualified physician gives the person a psychiatric
examination and determines that ,failure to hospitalize would create a
likelihood of serious harm by reason of mental illness. 125 The person
must then be discharged at the end of the ten-day period unless
the hospital files a petition for further commitment with the district
courL' 26 The law permits a maximum of fourteen days between the
filing of a petition for commitment by the hospital and the time of the
judicial hearing on commitment. 127 Thus, a person may be committed
involuntarily without judicial review for a maximum of twenty-four
days.'"
Section 12 contrasts sharply with the statutes of other states, most
of which require, or permit a patient to request, that a hearing be held
within five days after emergency involuntary commitment. 429 Because
emergency commitment processes vary greatly from state to state with
create a likelihood of serious harm by reason of mental illness may restrain such
person and apply for the hospitalization of such person for a ten day period....
(b) Only if the application for hospitalization under the provisions of this section
is made by a physician specifically designated to have the authority to admit to a
facility in accordance with the regulations of the department, shall such person be
admitted to the facility immediately after his reception. If the application is made
by someone other than a designated physician, such person shall be given a psychi-
atric examination by a designated physician immediately after his reception at such
facility. If the physician determines that failure to hospitalize such person would
create a likelihood of serious harm by reason of mental illness he may admit such
person to the facility for care and treatment.
(d) A person shall be discharged at the end of the ten-day period unless the
superintendent applies for a commitment under the provisions of sections seven
and eight of this chapter or the person remains on a voluntary status.
See id.
121 Id. § 12(a).
125 See id. § 12(b).
129 See id. § 12(d).
127 See id. §§ 7(c), 12(d).
125 See id. §§ 7(c), 12(d). When enacted in 1970, section 12 required that hospitals notify
district courts of all emergency commitments and provide evidence that hospitalization was
needed to avoid serious harm. See Zuckoff, supra note I, at Al. If the evidence was ''shaky," an
immediate hearing was required. See id. In 1971, this provision was deleted front the statute. See
id.
129 See id. See generally CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a•502(d) (West 1998) (person detained
has right to request hearing that shall be held within 72 hours, excluding weekends and holidays);
LA. Rev. STAT. ANN. tit, 28 § 55.D. (West 1998) (person confuted has right to demand hearing
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respect to the standard for commitment, length of commitment and
timing of judicial review, it is difficult to draw broad conclusions based
on any one aspect of a state's procedural scherne."° A state that re-
quires judicial review within twenty-four hours of commitment may
appear to provide more due process protection than a state that allows
commitment for a longer period. If the state requiring immediate
judicial review, however, has a low standard for commitment, the due
process protection it provides is diminished. Nevertheless, according
to a study conducted by the Globe and the American Bar Association's
Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law, the twenty-four-day
period of commitment without judicial review permissible in Massa-
chusetts is the longest period of commitment without judicial review
in the country.' 3 '
B. Boston Globe Article Draws Attention to Section 12
On May 12, 1997, a front-page article in the Globe on the emer-
gency commitment process drew public attention to section 12. 132 The
article described several cases of apparently improper emergency com-
mitments under section 12, including Susan Rockwell's case, discussed
in the Introduction.' 33 The Globe report cited such abuses of section
12 to illustrate the need for reform of the emergency commitment
process.' 34 The Globe investigation revealed that Massachusetts law
permits the longest period of emergency commitment without judicial
review in the nation.' 33 Specifically, the study conducted by the Globe
and the American Bar Association's Commission on Mental and Physi-
cal Disability Law found that twenty-five states and the District of
Columbia require court involvement within seventy-two hours of emer-
gency involuntary comminnent. 136 Fourteen other states require court
involvement within five days of commiunent.' 37 The laws of the remain-
ing states vary, with most requiring court involvement within six to
eight days.' 38
that shall be held within five days); N.Y. MENTAL 1ivc. LAW § 9.39(a) (McKinney 1998) (patient
may request hearing that shall he held riot more than five days after such request is received).
1 " See LEVY & RuBEN5rEiN, supra note 44, at 68-72; Hermann, supra note 91, at 92.
131 See Don Aucoin & Mitchell Zuckoff, !Worm of Emergency Committals Urged Lawmakers Push
for Patient's Rights After Series Exposes Abuses of Law, BOSTON GLOBE, May 13, 1997, at 131.
132 See Zuckoff, supra note I, at Al.
133 See id.
134
 See id.
135 See id.
136
 See id.
"7 See Zuckoff, supra note 1, at Al.
199 See id.
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C. Responses to the Boston Globe Series
The Globe series encouraged the Massachusetts District Court
Committee on Mental Health and Retardation to form an ad hoc
committee ("Ad Floc Committee") to take an in-depth look at section
12. 13' The Ad Hoc Committee was comprised of judges, clinicians,
hospital administrators and attorneys representing both hospital and
patient interests."° The Ad Hoc Committee sought to determine the
MOM. efficient and effective time lines to accomplish the purposes of
section 12, while minimizing the length of any involuntary hospitaliza-
tion periods for the patients involved."' On October 21, 1997, the Ad
Hoc Committee presented a report ("Majority Report") containing
recommendations for revisions to section 12 to the Massachusetts leg-
islature's Joint Committee on Human Services and Elderly Affairs." 2
Because the patient advocates on the Ad Hoc Committee disagreed
with some of these recommendations, they chose to present their own
report ("Minority Report") to the Joint Committee."'
1. The Majority Report of the Ad Hoc Committee
The Majority Report adopted, four proposals relating to the sec-
tion 12 emergency commitment process.'" First, it recognized the need
for patients admitted through the emergency commitment process to
have immediate access to counsel to address the many concerns that
arise with involuntary hospitalization."' Accordingly, the report pro-
posed that the Committee for Public Counsel Services ("CPCS"), which
139 See Majority Report, supra note 99, at 1.
14° See id. The members of the Committee were Paul Barr eira, M.D., Deputy Commissioner
for Clinical & Professional Services, Department of Mental Health; lion. Jonathan Brant, justice,
Cambridge District Court; Doris Carreiro, Esq., Assistant General Counsel, Department of Menial
Health; Robert Fleischner, Esq., Center for Public Representation; Stan Goldman, Esq., Director
of Mental Health Litigation, Committee for Public Counsel Services; lion, Timothy Ilillnian, First
Justice, Worcester District Court; Jennifer Honig, Esq., Mental Health Legal Advisors' Committee;
Catherine Mahoney, Esq., Deputy General Counsel, Beth Israel-Deaconess Medical Center; Mi-
chael C. Miller, M.D., Director of Ambulatory Services, Department of Psychiatry, Beth Israel-Dea-
coness Medical Center, East Campus; Thomas O'Hare, Esq., Legal Counsel, Newton-Wellesley
Hospital; Hon. Maurice H. Richardson, First Justice, Dedham District Court (Chair); Linda
Sahovey, R.N., M.S.N., Clinical Director, Boston Emergency Services Team; Steven Schwartz, Esq.,
Center for Public Representation; Paul Sununergrad, M.D., Chief of Inpatient Psychiatry, Massa-
chusetts General Hospital. See id. at attachment. Liaison, District Court Department was joint C.
Connors, Esq., Deputy Court Administrator and the Staff Liaison was Marilyn Wellington, Esq.,
Director of Forensic Legal Services, Department of Mental Health. See id.
" I See id. at 2,
142 See id. at I,
143 See id. at 2.
144 See Majority Report, supra note 99, at 5.
145 See id. at 2-3.
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provides representation for indigent persons, appoint counsel imme-
diately upon admission of a patient and that the counsel meet with the
patient within twenty-four hours of appointment.TM 6 The Majority Re-
port stated that immediate appointment of counsel was the single most
effective method of protecting a patient's rights. 197
Second, the Majority Report addressed the need for an emergency
commitment procedure to deal with inappropriate cases of involuntary
hospitalization, such as those highlighted in the Globe series.'" The
Majority Report proposed that patient's counsel be able to petition the
local district court for an emergency hearing on the issue of appropri-
ateness of commitment when counsel or the patient feels that the
circumstances of admission constituted a misuse of the involuntary
commitment procedures.'" The district court would hold emergency
hearings in such cases on the day that the petition is filed in court or,
at the latest, on the next business day.'"
Next, the Majority Report proposed that hospitals be required to
file a petition for commitment no later than the close of the third
business day following a patient's emergency admission pursuant to
section 12.' 5 ' The clinical representatives on the Ad Hoc Committee
stated that, in their professional judgment, this three-business-day pe-
riod is the minimum amount of time needed to evaluate a patient
appropriately and to make a determination of the need for continued
involuntary hospitalization. 152
Finally, the Majority Report recommended that a judicial commit-
ment hearing on the petition filed by the hospital be held no later
than the close of the fifth business day from the receipt of the peti-
tion.'" This would reduce the twenty-four-day period in which a patient
can be involuntarily held under current law without judicial review to
a maximum of eight to twelve days.'" All of the representatives of the
judiciary on the Ad Hoc Committee stated that a minimum of five
146 See id. at 3.
147 See id. The Committee also proposed that section 12(e) be amended to require immediate
appointment of counsel. See id. Section 12(e) provides that a district court judge—after a hearing
on a petition and the issuance of a warrant of apprehension, if necessary—may order the 10-day
involuntary hospitalization of a person who represents a likelihood of serious harm as a result of
mental illness. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 12(e).
148 See Majority Report, supra note 99, at 3.
142 See id. at 3-4.
15° See id.
151 See id. at 4.
152 See id.
155 See Majority Report, supra note 99, at 4.
154 See id. at 5.
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business days between the filing of the petition and the hearing was
necessary for the courts to process the petition, prepare the case file
and schedule a judge and other staff to travel to the petitioning hos-
pital to hold a hearing.' 55
2. The Minority Report of the Ad Hoc Committee
Three members of the Ad Hoc Committee, all of whom were
representatives of and advocates for persons with mental disabilities,
opposed the majority proposal for two reasons.I 56 First, the majority
proposal did not call for a prompt probable cause hearing in every
case of emergency commitment to determine whether the initial de-
tention was appropriate.'" Second, the majority proposal did not pro-
vide a prompt judicial hearing on the need for extended commit-
ment. 158
a. Probable Cause Hearing
The Minority Report advocated a probable cause hearing that
would require the Commonwealth, or its designee (the psychiatrist
and/or the hospital), to prove to a court in every case that the statutory
standard for involuntary commitment was met. 159 Relying principally
on Lessard v. Schmidt, the Minority Report stated that due process
mandates a probable cause hearing as soon as possible after the patient
is deprived of his or her liberty.m Therefore, the Minority Report
rejected the emergency hearing procedure proposed by the majority
because its purpose was restricted to correcting obvious abuses of the
emergency commitment process, rather than providing a judicial fo-
rum for the determination of probable cause in every case of emer-
gency commitment.' 61 Moreover, the Minority Report noted that the
emergency hearing process proposed by the majority requires that the
patient request the emergency hearing and, therefore, bear the burden
of proof. 162
The. Minority Report noted that even though the dissenting mem-
bers believed that a prompt probable cause hearing was constitution-
155 See id. at 4.
156 See Minority Report, supra note 82, at I.
357
 See id.
368
 See id.
359
 See id.
lo See id.
161 See Minority Report, supra note 82, at 2.
102
 See id.
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ally mandated, they agreed during meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee
that a full commitment hearing within a very short period of time after
commitment would obviate the need for a probable cause hearing in
most cases.' 63 The dissenting members offered this approach as an
alternative to the Majority Report. 164 The Ad Hoc Committee's final
recommendation, however, which rejected the minority's alternative
approach, made the absence of a prompt probable cause hearing
unacceptable to the minority.' 65
b. Length of Time Before Judicial Hearing on Extended Commitment
The dissenting members also disagreed with the time frame pro-
posed by the majority for scheduling a hearing on extended commit.
ment, namely, requiring that the hospital file a petition for commit-
ment within three business days and that the court schedule a hearing
on the hospital's petition within five business days.' 66 The Minority
Report stated that in light of the Ad Hoc Committee's decision not to
recommend a mandatory probable cause hearing, the proposed time
frame for judicial review was unreasonably long.' 67
As an alternative to the Majority Report, the Minority Report
proposed that the three-business-day time period during which the
hospital may file a commitment petition runs concurrently with the
five-business-day time period the court has to schedule a hearing.' 63
This concurrent approach would reduce the amount of time a patient
may wait for a court hearing from eight business days to five business
days. 169 Specifically, the minority's concurrent approach would require
that on the first business day after the patient's involuntary admission,
the hospital notify both CPCS, which would promptly appoint an
attorney to represent the person, and the court, which would tenta-
tively schedule a hearing within five days."° If the hospital then files a
commitment petition, the hearing would be confirmed."' If the hos-
pital does not file a petition, the hearing would be canccled. 372
163 See id.
161 See id.
165
 See id.
169 See Minority Report, supra note 82, at 3.
167 See id.
168
 See id.
" See id.
179
 See id.
171 See Minority Report, supra note 82, at 3.
172 See id.
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In the Majority Report, the Ad Hoc Committee stated that the
minority's concurrent approach was unacceptable to the majority, in-
cluding all of the judiciary department members, because it would
require courts to set up schedules for judges to go to hearings that
might never be held. In particular, the majority described such a system
as "an undesirable aberration to the normal filing process in our busy
court system."m The Minority Report stated that the canceled hearings
that would inevitably result under this concurrent approach already
occur in the current commitment process.' 74 Under the present system,
hearings are frequently canceled because the hospital decides to with-
draw its petition or the person agrees to remain at the hospital on a
voluntary basis. 175 The Minority Report noted that the study of com-
mitment petitions filed in the Cambridge Division of the Massachusetts
District Court revealed that more than sixty-seven percent of scheduled
hearings are canceled for these reasons under the present system.' 76
4. Constitutionality of Proposed Changes to Section 12
The Supreme Court's summary affirmances of both Logan v. Ara-
feh and French v. Blackburn, in which three-judge panels upheld statutes
permitting forty-five and ten-day periods of commitment without a
hearing, respectively, indicate that the emergency commitment proce-
dures proposed by the Majority Report satisfy due process require-
ments. 177 These decisions suggest that the absence of a prompt prob-
able cause hearing in these proposals does not violate due process. 178
Rather, as the Second Circuit reasoned in Project Release, the constitu-
tionality of a statute should depend on the totality of the procedural
scheme.'"
The Majority Report calls for a time frame that would provide
judicial review within eight business days of commitment.'" Addition-
ally, it advocates for an emergency system whereby patients could ob-
tain immediate hearings when the circumstances of admission consti-
I " Majority Report, supra note 99, at 6.
174 See Minority Report, supra note 82, at 3.
175 See id.
179 See id. at 2 n,4.
177 See French v. Blackburn, 428 F. Sum), 1351, 1356 (M.D.N.C. 1977), affd mem., 443 U.S.
901 (1979); Logan v. Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. 1265, 1268 (D. Cont. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Briggs v.
Arafeh, 411 U.S. 911 (1973); see also flicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1975) (United States
Supreme Court summary decisions arc binding on lower courts).
'7a
	 Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. at 1956; Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. at 1268.
179 See Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 974, 975 (2d Cir. 1983).
Is° See Majority Report, supra note 99, at 5.
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tine a misuse of the involuntary commitment process.' 8 ' Furthermore,
the opportunity for patients to have counsel appointed immediately
will enhance their ability to take full advantage of these hearings.'"
Thus, when considered as a whole, the layers of due process protection
provided by this proposal comport with due process.' 83
The Minority Report's position that due process requires a prompt
probable cause hearing is not supported by case law. 184
 The Minority
Report relies principally on the United States District Court's reason-
ing in Lessard to support its contention that due process requires a
probable cause hearing as soon as possible after commitment.'" The
Supreme Court's affirmances of Blackburn and Arafeh effectively over-
ruled Lessard.'" Thus, the Minority Report's assertion that due process
requires a prompt probable cause hearing is unfounded.'"
ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED EMERGENCY COMMITMENT PROCEDURES
An ideal emergency commitment process is one that best protects
patients' rights in practice.'" To develop such a process, it is essential
to recognize that in most cases, emergency commitment affects both
the liberty interests and the clinical interests of the patient.'" Striking
a workable balance between these competing interests requires consid-
eration of this issue from the civil libertarian, clinical and public
perspectives. The Ad Hoc Committee's Majority Report, described
above, best respects both liberty and clinical interests because it bal-
181 See id. at 3-4.
182 See id. at 5.
183
 See Project Release, 722 F.2d at 974, 975.
184 See id. at 974-75; Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. at 1356; Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. at 1268.
1g5 See Minority Report, supra note 82, at 1.
•18ti See Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. at 1356; Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1091 (E.D. Wis.
1972); Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. at 1268.
187 See Blackburn, 428 F. Stipp. at 1356; Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. at 1268. The Minority Report
stated that "Mit a series of consistent constitutional decisions, numerous federal courts held that
states must provide a prompt probable cause hearing after a person is involuntarily detained."
Minority Report, .supra note 82, at 1. In support of this statement, the report cited Lessard and
Cannon v. Garland County, 948 F. Supp. 1368 (W.D. Ark. 1996). See id. In Cannon, the United
States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas held that an Arkansas involuntary
commitment statute that allowed a hearing to be held up to I 1 days after admission violated
constitutional due process requirements. See Cannon, 948 F. Supp. at 1369, 1380. The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals later vacated the district court's decision, however, because it concluded
that the plaintiff lacked standing. See Cannon v. Garland County, 141 F.3d 1167, 1998 WL. 172612,
at *I (8th Cir. 1998) (unpublished disposition).
188 See Hermann, supra note 91, at 94-95.
LSll See id.
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adces the need for prompt judicial review after deprivation of liberty
with the clinical needs of patients.' 9°
First, the time frame for judicial review proposed by the Majority
Report would effectively serve both clinical and liberty interests.' 9 '
Requiring hospitals to file a petition for commitment within three
business days of emergency commitment marks a significant reduction
from the present ten-day period permitted by section 12. 192 Moreover,
because many acute psychiatric episodes subside within one to four
days, the three-business-day period would allow the hospital to make
an informed decision on the need for further commitment or to
decide that the patient has improved sufficiently to be released.'"
Second, the Majority Report's recommendation that a judicial commit-
ment hearing on the petition filed by the hospital be held within five
business days of receipt of the petition represents a fair balancing of
the patient's right to a hearing and the burdens the hearing process
places on the judicial system.'" In considering this five-day period, it
is important to note that the Majority Report suggests that these hear-
ings be held at the hospitals and to recognize the scheduling difficul-
ties that this may pose.'" Holding the hearings at the hospitals is less
disruptive for patients and makes the process seem less criminal in
nature.'" Moreover, by not requiring physicians to travel to court, it
also reduces the amount of time that the commitment process takes
away from physicians' clinical duties.'"
Although emergency commitment for eight business days without
judicial review may seem outrageous when compared to the due proc-
ess procedures afforded by the criminal justice system, in practice, this
199 See Majority Report, supra note 99, at 5.
"'See id.
192 See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. Cll. 123, § 12(d).
193 See Stronibcrg & Stone, supra note 39, at 324.
194 See Majority Report, supra note 99, at 5.
195 See id. at 4.
106 Some people who have been involuntarily committed, however, believe that hearings
should be held at courthouses. On April 7, 1998, the Massachusetts legislature's Joint Committee
on Human Services and Elderly Affairs held a hearing on a bill to revise section 12. The bill
incorporated all of the proposals of the Majority Report. See H.R. 5402, 180th Leg., 2d Spec. Sess.
(Mass. 1998). At the hearing, several persons who had been involuntarily committed testified that
commitment hearings should be held at courthouses. See An Act to Reform the Civil Commitment
Process for Persons with Mental Illness: Hearing on UR. 5402, 180th Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Mass.
1998) (statement of Judi Chamberlin). For examplc, Judi Chamberlin, an advocate for persons
with mental disabilities who was once involuntarily committed herself, stated that hearings held
in hospitals do not make impressions on patients as being judicial process. See id, Ms. Chamberlin
testified that patients want "their day in court." See id
'97 See Thompson v. Commonwealth, 438 N.E.2d 33, 37 (Mass. 1982) (expressing concern
about demands judicial hearings place on psychiatrists' time).
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time frame provides more due process protection than would an im-
mediate probable cause hearing.' 98 If a hearing were held immediately
after admission, physicians would be forced to seek commitment for
many patients whose condition might improve sufficiently for them to
be released a few days later.' 99
 If a hearing were held after eight business
days, however, such patients would be released prior to court involve-
ment. 20° Moreover, because judges seem unwilling to second-guess the
judgment of physicians, immediate probable cause hearings would
likely result in rubber stamps on physicians' commitment petitions. 2°'
The Cambridge District Court study that revealed that only five percent
of patients for whom commitment. petitions were filed were discharged
as a result of the petitions being denied indicates that judicial review
is not a patient's best means of securing an early discharge. 202 Faced
with the decision of releasing a patient whose mental illness, according
to a physician, poses a serious harm to him or herself or others, most
judges would defer to the professional judgment of the physician.
Thus, although an immediate probable cause hearing would, in the
abstract, comport more with civil libertarian notions of fairness, in
practice, a hearing held some days after admission would provide
greater protection for a person's liberty. 208
Furthermore, the procedure For requesting an emergency hearing
when counsel or the patient feels that the circumstances of admission
constitute a misuse of section 12 would provide an additional layer of
protection. 204
 This emergency hearing process would address the con-
cern that the time frame of the emergency commitment process pre-
sumes a need for a clinical relationship. Thus, in cases such as Susan
Rockwell's, where there was no basis for admission under section 12,
198 See Stromberg & Stone, supra note 39, at 324.
199 See id.
200 See id.; Brant, supra note 108, at 1,
201 See Brant, supra note 108, at 1 (estimating approximately five percent of patients dis-
charged as a result of petitions for commitment being denied); see also Kenneth 1... Appelbaum,
M.D. & William II. Fisher, Ph.D., judges' Assumptions About the Appropriateness of Civil and Forensic
Commitment, PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES, May 1997, at 711. A survey of Massachusetts district court
judges asked if they ever "felt concerned that the mental health system might inadequately treat
or prematurely discharge a patient" who had been civilly committed. Id. Fifty-four judges, 93.1%
of those who responded, acknowledged having concerns about the adequacy of treatment or
confinement in the civil mental health system, See id. Although this survey does not relate directly
to the likelihood of a judge's denying a commitment petition, it does provide some insight into
judges' views of the commitment process.
2°2
 See Brant, supra note 108, at 1.
209 ,See Sucmtberg & Stone, supra note 39, at 324.
204 See Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 974 (2d Cir. 1983); Majority Report, supra
note 99, at 3-4,
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patients can petition the court for a hearing to be held no later than
the next business day after the petition is filed. 2°5
One potential problem with such an emergency hearing process,
however, is defining the grounds for requesting a hearing. The Major-
ity Report does not contain specific guidelines for the emergency
hearing process. The criteria for an emergency hearing must be suf-
ficiently narrow so that these hearings do not become routine. 2416 Be-
cause all section 12 commitments are involuntary, most patients would
undoubtedly feel that their admissions were improper and that they
deserve emergency hearings. A patient's disagreement with his or her
admission under section 12, however, is not necessarily tantamount to
an improper commitment and should not trigger an emergency hear-
ing in every case. Moreover, if such emergency hearings were to be-
come a substitute for the regular system of judicial review, they would
be counterproductive to the patients' interests and would overburden
the judicial systern. 267 Therefore, emergency hearings should be avail-
able only when the circumstances of the emergency admission suggest
that the admitting physician did not make reasonable efforts to ensure
that commitment was necessary, e.g., when the admitting physician did
not conduct a thorough examination of the patient.
Of all the elements of the proposals described in Part II, perhaps
the most significant is the element calling for immediate appointment
of counse1. 208 Appointing counsel immediately would serve the inter-
ests of patients, physicians and the courts because it would increase the
likelihood of an extrajudicial resolution of improper section 12 admis-
sions. Where a patient's admission under section 12 was a clear abuse
of the process, the patient's counsel would be able to work with the
physician and the hospital's counsel to resolve the matter immediately.
In Susan Rockwell's case, for example, immediate appointment of
counsel almost certainly would have resulted in her being discharged
more quickly. 209 Appointed counsel could have facilitated her discharge
by arranging a conference between the admitting physician and Rock-
well's psychiatrist.m Moreover, even in cases of proper admission, im-
mediate appointment of counsel would enhance patients' rights. 2" If
202 See Majority Report, supra note 99, at 3-4,
200 Cf. 7'hampson, 438 N.E.2d at 57 (noting intolerable fiscal and administrative burdens that
would result if there were no means of disposing or discouraging filing of frivolous applications
pursuant to MASS. GEN. LAWS eh. 123, fi 9(h)).
2°7 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,348 (1976); Thompson, 438 N.E.2d at 37.
208 See Majority Report, supra note 99, at 3.
209 See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying, text.
21° See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text,
211 See CIIAMBERL1N, supra note 87, at 39.
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patients believe that the physicians are not acting in their best interests,
counsel may be the only person whom the patients believe they can
trust. 212 It should be noted, however, that requiring immediate appoint-
ment of counsel would place an added burden on CPCS. Therefore,
the Commonwealth should provide CPCS with sufficient funding so
that it would be able to meet this demand.
It. is worthwhile to note that the Minority Report calling for a
prompt probable cause hearing was supported exclusively by patient
advocates and representatives. 213 This may signal a fundamental clash
of perspectives on what should be the goals of emergency commitment
procedures.24 Whereas the Majority Report balances the clinical and
liberty interests of patients, the Minority Report focuses exclusively on
the patient's legal rights. The primary goal of the Minority Report
appears to be to design a system that will meet the needs of the
relatively small percent of persons admitted improperly under section
12. 2 ' 5
 In doing so, it does not address the clinical needs of the majority
of patients who are properly admitted. 216 If one looks at the involuntary
commitment process only from the perspective of the criminal justice
system, it is easy to reject the idea that liberty interests should be
balanced against clinical interests. 217 If, however, one acknowledges the
therapeutic aspect of the involuntary commitment process, considera-
tion of a patient's clinical needs is essential to protecting a patient's
r igh ts. 2is
CONCLUSION
An emergency commitment statute should reflect the fact that the
emergency commitment process affects both liberty and clinical inter-
ests. Because the emergency commitment process deprives persons of
their liberty, persons subject to it must have a means of quickly chal-
lenging physicians' decisions to admit them. At the same time, how-
212 See id.
219 See Minority Report, supra note 82, at I. The introductory paragraph of the Minority
Report states: "Several members of the Committee strongly disagree with the recommendations
of the majority. These members are all representatives and advocates for persons with mental
disabilities." Id.
214 See id.
215 See id. at 2. The Minority. RepOrt criticized the emergency hearing process proposed by
the Majority Report because its purpose was "restricted to correcting obvious abuses in the
emergency detention process, rather than providing a judicial forum for all involuntarily detained
persons for the constitutionally-required determination of probable cause." Id.
216 See Hermann, sutra note 91, at 94-95, 106.
217 See id.
218 See id.
March 1999]	 EMERGENCY CIVIL COMMITMENTS	 699
ever, it must be remembered that the purpose of the emergency com-
mitment process is therapeutic and that the consequences of failing to
admit someone when warranted can be severe. The most effective
means of protecting these competing interests is to appoint counsel
immediately and to provide a procedure for requesting an emergency
hearing when counsel or the patient feels that the circumstances of
the admission constituted a misuse of the emergency commitment
process. This would allow for fast resolution of cases of improper
commitment. in which there are no clinical interests at stake. For cases
of emergency commitment that do not require emergency hearings,
judicial review within eight business days would provide protection of
patients' liberty interests and allow time for possible extra-judicial
resolutions of the involuntary commitments. Equally important, a hear-
ing within eight business days would provide physicians sufficient time
to make informed decisions on the need for continued commitment
and, therefore, best protect patients' clinical interests.
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